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Abstract We report experimental ﬁndings about subjects’ behavior in dynamic decision prob-
lems involving multistage lotteries with diﬀerent timings of resolution of uncertainty. Our within-
subject design allows us to study violations of the Independence axiom and of the dynamic axioms:
Dynamic Consistency, Consequentialism and Reduction of Compound Lotteries. More precisely
we investigate the extensions in a dynamic framework of the pattern of choices observed in the
Common Ratio Eﬀect (CRE). We study the eﬀects of changes in probability and outcomes over
CRE-like violations of each dynamic axiom as well as the eventual association between the inde-
pendence axiom and each dynamic axiom. We ﬁnd that, although probability and outcomes do
not have an impact on general violation levels of the dynamic axioms, each of these parameter
dimensions play an important role when it comes to CRE-like violations of the axioms: the proba-
bility level for Reduction of Compound Lottery and Dynamic Consistency and the outcomes levels
for Consequentialism. Moreover, we ﬁnd that an important proportion of our subjects verify the
Independence axiom but violate some dynamic axioms in a systematic manner. This accounts for
the fact that dynamic axioms are not only extensions of the Independence axiom to a dynamic
framework but also capture preferences that are independent of those observed with single stage
lotteries.
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1 Introduction 1
One of the most robust violations of Expected Utility Theory (EUT) is the Common Ratio Eﬀect 2
(CRE). CRE, exhibited in the pattern of choices shown in Figure 1, is one of the main eﬀects (with 3
CommonConsequence Eﬀect) related to the Allais paradoxes1 (Allais1953, McCrimmon & Larsson 4
1979, Kahneman & Tversky 1979, Starmer & Sugden 1989) which cast doubt upon the descrip- 5
tive adequacy of the independence axiom2 (IND). These violations of EUT led to new models 6
of decision under risk (non-EU models) which account for these eﬀects and thus have stronger 7
descriptive power in a static set up. 8
A :  
x1 q
0 1 − q
≺ B :   x2
1
A′ :  
x1 rq
0 1 − rq
≻ B′ :  
x2 r
0 1 − r
Fig. 1: Common Ratio Eﬀect pattern of choices (Allais 1953)
In fact, IND is a property of preferences over one stage lotteries. It has however been connected 9
with choice behavior in dynamic decision problems. The mixture operation involved in IND was 10
originally interpreted in terms of composition of lotteries (von Neumann & Morgenstern 1947). 11
Dynamically there are several ways of composing two lotteries. One can consider the compound 12
lottery prior to the resolution of any uncertainty, or after the resolution of the uncertainty of 13
the ﬁrst lottery. This allows us to deﬁne the three dynamic axioms that are studied in this 14
paper. Figure 2 (p5) gives a graphical representation of these axioms (see Cubitt et al. 1998 and 15
Wakker 1999) namely Consequentialism, Dynamic Consistency and Reduction of Compound Lotteries. 16
Formally, Burks (1977) and later Karni & Schmeidler (1991) showed that one satisﬁes these three 17
dynamic principles only if the induced preference relation over one stage lotteries satisﬁes IND. 18
Reciprocally, Volij (1994) made it clear that a Non-EU model of decision under risk that relaxes 19
IND must specify which one of the three dynamic axioms mentioned above is not satisﬁed. Indeed, 20
he showed that if two of the three aforementioned dynamic axioms are veriﬁed, then the remaining 21
one is equivalent to the independence axiom3. In these theorems, one makes the hypothesis that 22
only one dynamic axiom can be violated at a time. From a descriptive perspective, it is however 23
1 The original parameters proposed by Allais are the following : x1 = 5Me, x2 = 1Me, q = 0.9 and r = 0.1.
2 The choice pattern A ≻ B and B′ ≻ A′ is also a violation of IND called reverse common ratio eﬀect (RCRE).
3 Logically, it means:
- If RCL and CON hold then DC ⇔ IND. (Karni & Schmeidler 1991)When Allais meets Ulysses: Dynamic axioms and the Common Ratio Eﬀect 3
possible to observe simultaneous violations of the dynamic axioms in a way that do not necessarily 24
imply violations of the independence axiom. 25
In this paper, we build on the work of Cubitt et al. (1998) who provided valuable empirical 26
information4 about Consequentialism (CON), Dynamic Consistency (DC)5 and Reduction of 27
Compound Lotteries (RCL) using a between-subject design. We propose an experimental de- 28
sign that allows two main innovations ; ﬁrst we test each dynamic axiom at an individual level 29
(within-subject design), second we perform these within-subject tests for diﬀerent values of the 30
parameters. We can therefore determine which dynamic principle is more prone to be violated 31
and the direction of violation depending on the outcome and the ratio levels. We can also account 32
for simultaneous violations of the dynamic axioms and test the association between IND and each 33
axiom. We provide new insights about how the type of rejection of each axiom depends on the 34
outcomes and probability (ratio) levels. Our results and ﬁndings are relevant in order to further 35
our understanding of risky decisions in a dynamic context and of the impact of the timing of reso- 36
lution of uncertainty on individual decision behavior. More precisely, we connect standard ﬁndings 37
of choices between one stage lotteries to new observations of choice behavior in more sophisticated 38
dynamic contexts. Because the timing and the probability of resolution of uncertainty as well as 39
its consequences have strong behavioral implications and diﬀer in many real-life situations, the 40
results of our study should deepen our interpretation of many existing stylized facts concerning 41
choice under risk. 42
Notably,we reproduce the benchmark results of Cubitt et al. (1998) and of McCrimmon & Larsson 43
(1979). We conﬁrm that for the independence axiom the smaller the probability level (ratio) and 44
the higher the outcomes, the more frequently CRE is observed. For the dynamic axioms, we ﬁnd 45
that for RCL and DC, the rate of CRE violations is higher for small ratio values, but is not aﬀected 46
by the outcome level; whereas for CON, CRE violations are more frequently observed with high 47
outcomes. These results are conﬁrmed when subjects who violate more than one dynamic axioms 48
are excluded from our sample. This category of subjects is of particular interest and is composed 49
in a grand majority of individuals who satisfy IND but violate two dynamic axioms in an opposite 50
direction. Interestingly, more than 75% of them exhibits CRE violations of CON and RCRE vio- 51
lations of RCL. This systematic pattern of violations constitutes an empirical contradiction to the 52
implicit normative hypothesis (Karni & Schmeidler 1991, Volij 1994) that violations of dynamic 53
axioms are necessarily connected to violations of independence. Finally, we ﬁnd that CON is the 54
- If RCL and DC hold then CON ⇔ IND. (Volij 1994)
- If DC and CON hold then RCL ⇔ IND. (Volij 1994)
4 The ﬁrst experimental investigation of the decomposition of the independence axiom in a dynamic set up is
due to Kahneman & Tversky (1979). Indeed, the isolation eﬀect comes from the decomposition of IND between
CON and DC+RCL.
5 In this study the authors refer to separability and timing independence for what we call consequentialism
and dynamic consistency.4 Nebout, A. and Dubois, D.
best candidate as a dynamic version of independence (as suggested by Machina 1989) since we 55
ﬁnd a signiﬁcant association only between IND and CON. 56
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents our notation, the tasks used in the experiment, 57
and the way to detect acceptance or rejection of dynamic axioms from the patterns of choices 58
on these tasks. It also discusses the relationship between the terminology used for the axioms 59
and existing literature. Section 3 describes our experimental design. The results of the study are 60
presented in section 4. Finally section 5 summarizes and discusses the experimental ﬁndings. 61
2 Preliminaries 62
We now present the three dynamic axioms. The terminology we use is in strict accordance with 63
Karni & Schmeidler (1991). 64
2.1 Notation and decision problems 65
Let us introduce the decision tasks we used in the experiment. We restrict ourselves to the set 66
L of two-outcome lotteries where outcomes can be three monetary values taken from {x1,x2,0} 67
such that x1 > x2 > 0 . Let < be a preference relation over L. We identify four types of choice 68
problems (Cubitt et al. 1998) : scaled down, scaled up, prior lottery and two-stage. In ﬁgure 2, 69
they are represented following standard notation where circles correspond to chance nodes and 70
squares to decision nodes. For decision nodes, we note by Uk (resp. Dk) the choice of up (resp. 71
down) in problem Sk, k = 1,...,4. 72
First, in the scaled down and the scaled up problems, the choice patterns [D1/U4] and [U1/D4] 73
contradict the independence axiom6. Similarly, in the scaled up and the prior lottery problems, 74
choice patterns [D1/U2] and [U1/D2] contradict CON. In the prior lottery and the two stage lottery 75
problems, the choice patterns [D2/U3] and [U2/D3] are violations of DC. In the two stage lottery 76
and scaled down problems, choice patterns [D3/U4] and [U3/D4] contradict RCL. More speciﬁcally, 77
the pattern [D1/U4] corresponds to the common ratio eﬀect. So we call the patterns [D1/U2], 78
[D2/U3] and [D3/U4] CRE violations (in opposition to the RCRE violations)of, respectively, CON, 79
DC and RCL that correspond to CRE in a dynamic set up. By contrast, choice patterns [Di/Dj] 80
and [Ui/Uj] respect the corresponding axiom depending on i and j and are therefore acceptance 81
patterns. These dynamic axioms can therefore be tested within the revealed preference paradigm 82
in order to complement the existing theoretical research into these concepts. 83
6 Indeed, with P = (x2;1), Q = (x1,0;q), R = (0;1) ∈ L these patterns imply that: ∃ P,Q,R ∈ L,∃r ∈
[0,1]s.t.P ≻ Q < rP + (1 − r)R ≻ rQ + (1 − r)R which is the negation of IND which is formally stated as :
∀ P,Q,R ∈ L,∀r ∈ [0,1], P < Q ⇔ rP +(1−r)R < rQ+(1−r)R. Subsequently, r is called ratio to recall the
common ratio eﬀect that contradicts this axiom (r = 0.1 in the original paradox of Allais 1953).When Allais meets Ulysses: Dynamic axioms and the Common Ratio Eﬀect 5
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Fig. 2: Dynamic axioms and independence axiom for two outcomes lotteries
2.2 Consequentialism (CON) 84
This term was ﬁrst introduced in the formal Decision Theory literature by Hammond (1988, 1989) 85
and refers to the idea that acts are only valued by their consequences7. Formulated in terms of 86
decision trees, consequentialism “would be false if missed opportunities, regrets, sunk costs, etc. 87
aﬀected behaviour and yet were excluded from the domain of consequences”. In this paper, we 88
deﬁne consequentialism as shown in ﬁgure 2. This is a special case of Hammond’s (1988) notion8. 89
In fact, it corresponds to the separability condition in Machina (1989), Cubitt et al. (1998) and 90
McClennen (1990) and to forgone event independence in Wakker (1999). We argue that CON 91
means that choice behavior should not be inﬂuenced by an uncertainty already resolved. If CON 92
is abandoned, then behavior is aﬀected by events that are known not to have happened at the 93
moment of decision and therefore involves counterfactual reasoning about outcomes that could 94
have occurred but are revealed not to. Machina (1989) and McClennen (1990) argued that CON 95
7 In ethics, the term “consequentialism” was ﬁrst used by Anscombe (1958)
8 Consequentialism in the sense of Hammond is the conjunction of the two axioms we call CON and RCL.6 Nebout, A. and Dubois, D.
is an inappropriate property to impose on a Non-EU model because it is a dynamic version of 96
separability which constitutes, for them, the core of the independence axiom. 97
2.3 Dynamic consistency (DC) 98
Karni & Safra (1989, 1990) used the term Dynamic Consistency for strategies in a sequential 99
decision problem. A strategy is dynamically consistent if the ex-ante plan is actually implemented 100
at each step (decision node) of the sequential problem. We restrict this deﬁnition to preferences 101
towards dynamic single decision problems and consider that, when ex-post and ex-ante preferences 102
relative to the resolution of an uncertainty correspond, DC is veriﬁed. This is motivated by the 103
approach used by Cubitt et al. (1998) with the diﬀerence being that we merge what they called 104
“timing independence” and context independence under the same axiom, dynamic consistency 105
(DC). Violation of DC has great implications when dealing with sequential decision problems 106
because it renders the use of backward induction reasoning ineﬀective and therefore requires the 107
use of alternative sequential strategies. There exists more empirical research into violations of DC 108
than for CON (Busemeyer et al. 2000, Barkan & Busemeyer 2003, Hey & Panaccione 2011). 109
2.4 Reduction of Compound Lotteries (RCL) 110
There is a consensus about the deﬁnition of Reduction of Compound Lotteries in the literature. 111
This axiom describes the ability to compute probabilities according to the deﬁnition of conditional 112
probability. Segal (1987, 1990) argued that multiple stage gambles should be distinguished from 113
single stage gambles and described the dynamic behavior of an individual who does not satisfy 114
this axiom. Bar-Hillel (1973), Carlin (1992), Budescu & Fischer (2001) provide empirical evidence 115
of violation of RCL where, most of the time, the multiple stage gamble is preferred to the reduced 116
single stage one. Therefore according to this axiom the preferences observed in a choice between a 117
two stage prospects and another option should be the same than the one observed if this two stage 118
gamble is replaced by its reduced single stage counterpart. Therefore, if choices in the two-stage 119
and in the scale down problem are not the same, then RCL is not satisﬁed. 120When Allais meets Ulysses: Dynamic axioms and the Common Ratio Eﬀect 7
3 Experimental design 121
3.1 Architecture 122
The experiment was conducted at the LEEM9 experimental lab in Montpellier (France). A total 123
of 114 participants10, graduate and undergraduate students from various disciplines took part in 124
a computerized experiment. A typical session lasted for about 1 hour and was composed of 30 125
questions of 4 diﬀerent kinds11(presented as Si in ﬁgure 2). We opt for a 2×2×2 design in order 126
to control and test for the eﬀects of the following three dimensions: 127
– We ﬁxed two levels for the ratio: rL = 0.3 and rH = 0.7. For rL, we choose a value close but 128
slightly higher than the one (r = 0.25) used by Cubitt et al. (1998). For rH, we choose a value 129
slightly higher than the one (r = 0.6) used by Starmer & Sugden (1989) and for which they 130
observe more RCRE than CRE12. 131
– We ﬁxed two levels for the sure outcome x2 = 15e and x2 = 60e. McCrimmon & Larsson 132
(1979) found an increase in violations of the independence axiom, speciﬁcally CRE rejection, 133
for smaller ratios and higher outcomes. Therefore, we decided to control for the eﬀects of the 134
ratio and outcomes levels over the rate of acceptance/rejection of dynamic axioms. 135
– For each of these two levels of x2, we ﬁxed two levels of maximal gain x1. For x2 = 15e, we 136
choose x1 = 20e and x1 = 24e and for x2 = 60e, we choose x1 = 80e and x1 = 95e. We 137
introduce this additional dimension in order to control for the heterogeneity of risk attitudes 138
in our sample and to gain in statistical discriminative power. 139
With q = 0.8 for all the questions, this makes 8 questions per type of problem except for S1 where 140
there is no r. To sum up, the experiment13 was divided as follows: 141
(i) 4 scaled up problem (S1) questions involving a choice between a sure amount of money (x2;1) 142
and a lottery (x1,0;q) 143
(ii) 8+2 scaled down problem (S4) questions involving a choice between 2 lotteries : ((x2,0;r), 144
and lottery (x1,0;rq)). We added two questions to test for ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance by 145
proposing a choice between lottery (x,0;q) and lottery (x∗,0;q) with x∗ > x. 146
(iii) 8 two-stage problem (S3) questions involving a choice between a simple lottery (x2,x3;r), and 147
the two-stage lottery ((x1,0;q),0;r). 148
9 Laboratoire d’Economie Exp´ erimentale de Montpellier (France)
10 We ran 6 sessions of 19 participants each.
11 For every problem type, participants were given instructions and a short questionnaire to check their un-
derstanding of the task.
12 With the aim to study exclusively CRE violations of IND and of the dynamic axioms, it would have been
more adequate to use ratio values between 0.1 and 0.5. This is exactly what is done in Nebout & Willinger
(2012). However, in this study we are interested in both CRE and RCRE violations, so it is useful to have a
ratio value over one half.
13 Screenshots of each problem type are available in the appendix B.8 Nebout, A. and Dubois, D.
(iv) 8 Prior lottery problem (S2) questions where, ﬁrst, participants had to activate manually a 149
prior lottery. Then further instructions were displayed: depending on the outcome of the prior 150
lottery, either (with probability 1 − r) they get nothing and they was no choice to be made 151
or (with probability r) they were told to choose between a sure amount (x2;1) and a lottery 152
(x1,0;q). From an experimental point of view, an important aspect of this task is that 1−r is 153
the probability that the subject fails to reach the second stage and therefore the proportion 154
of missing data for this question. 155
As explained in section 2, our design allows us to test which, if any, axiom is violated for each 156
participant and each combination of parameters: for the independence axiom we compare S1 and 157
S4, for CON we compare S1 and S2, for DC we compare S2 and S3 and for RCL we compare S3 158
and S4. 159
A pilot study revealed that subjects had diﬃculties in answering questions involving multi-stage 160
lotteries, because of misunderstandings or task complexity. We therefore decided to introduce 161
such lotteries step by step, starting with simple choices between a lottery and a sure outcome 162
(S1) followed by choices between two lotteries (S4). For the question types S2 and S3, we control 163
for possible order eﬀects14 as follows : half of the subjects were confronted with the task sequence 164
S1/S4/S2/S3 and the other half with S1/S4/S3/S2. 165
3.2 Incentive system 166
The use of monetary incentives is the topic of an active debate among behavioral economists. 167
Depending on the type of experiment, the chosen incentive scheme might have a signiﬁcant im- 168
pact on the results (Camerer & Hogarth 1999, Read 2005, Bardsley et al. 2010, chapter 6). The 169
nature of our experimental design (multiple binary choices for each subject) raised the issue of 170
the most appropriate incentive schemes. In this section, we present the advantages and drawbacks 171
of each possible schemes and justify the choice of hypothetical payment that we implemented in 172
our experiment. 173
We identiﬁed four possible incentive schedules: “play one pay one”, “play all pay all”, random 174
incentive system (RIS) and hypothetical payment. There is no doubt that the “play one pay 175
one” solution is more appropriate for an experimental protocol investigating dynamic preferences 176
(Bardsley et al. 2010, p280). This requires forming several groups of subjects, each of them facing 177
one problem for real and in isolation. This solution, chosen by Cubitt et al. (1998), is ideal in 178
terms of incentives because it involves no risk of contamination between diﬀerent choice tasks and 179
no prediction failure. However such protocol consumes an important amount of time, money and 180
14 We do not found such eﬀect in our sample so we do not evoke this feature later in the paper.When Allais meets Ulysses: Dynamic axioms and the Common Ratio Eﬀect 9
subjects. Futhermore, with only one question asked to one subject, this methodology restricts the 181
analysis to a between-subject design and, by consequence, rules out any study of violations of 182
dynamic axioms at an individual level. For such a study, multiple questions per subject are re- 183
quired and the following criticism, anticipated by Cubitt et al. (1998), can be made : “If a subject 184
faces more than one decision problem in an experiment, then the experiment as a whole can be 185
understood as a single problem of dynamic choice. In order to interpret the subject’s responses 186
to such an experiment as revealing her preferences over the options in the individual problems, it 187
would be necessary to assume the truth of at least one of the dynamic choice principles which we 188
wish to test.” (p1372). This possibility of contamination is a risk that has to be taken in order to 189
obtain results about dynamic preferences at an individual level. For this purpose three incentive 190
schemes were available. 191
A ﬁrst idea would be to incentivize all the questions of the experiment and thus to pay the cumu- 192
lative gain at the end. In order to keep the payments reasonable, it would be necessary to reduce 193
the gain associated to each question or to introduce an exchange rate. That would force us to 194
use maximal gains between 0.5 e and 2 e in each lottery. Such amounts of money are unlikely to 195
motivate subjects. In addition, the diﬀerence between the outcome levels might be too small to 196
detect any eﬀect on the outcome dimension. There are also several drawbacks in incentivizing each 197
question like contamination, income and house money eﬀects. Since few studies use this method, 198
it would hinder comparison of our results with the existing literature. We therefore discarded this 199
solution. 200
Random incentive system (RIS) was another option. It consists in paying only one question ran- 201
domly selected from the set of answered questions at the end of the experiment. For our purposes, 202
Cubitt et al. (1998) argued that this option was not appropriate because the assumption justifying 203
RIS is isolation which is exactly what is investigated here15. Although several studies show that 204
RIS does not prevent subjects separating questions in a multiple tasks experiment (Hey & Lee 205
2005), we thought that this scheme was not adequate for the critical issues investigated in this 206
paper. 207
We decided to use hypothetical incentives following Kahneman & Tversky (1979) who claimed 208
that: “the method of hypothetical choices emerges as the simplest procedure by which a large 209
number of theoretical questions can be investigated. The use of the method relies on the assump- 210
tion that people often know how they would behave in actual situations of choice, and on the 211
15 “Since the random lottery incentive system is widely used in experimental economics this points to a further
motivation for testing dynamic choice principles. In any random lottery design, the subject makes precommit-
ments to actions to be taken conditional on a chance event. Timing independence implies that these precom-
mitments are in line with the actions which would be taken after the realisation of nature’s move. Separability
implies that the latter actions are identical to those which would have been taken at the relevant decision prob-
lems been faced in isolation and for real. Thus, timing independence (DC) and separability (CON) are jointly
suﬃcient for the validity of the random lottery incentive system.”10 Nebout, A. and Dubois, D.
further assumption that the subjects have no special reason to disguise their true preferences”. 212
Thus, we payed subject a ﬂat fee of 15e and compensated for travel costs with 5e or 10e depend- 213
ing on the journey required. Nevertheless, there are potential problems raised by this scheme. A 214
ﬁrst drawback is that it could bias participants’ attitude towards risk in reducing their level of risk 215
aversion (Beattie & Loomes 1997, Holt & Laury 2002). This eﬀect is not critical in our protocol 216
since the detection of violations of dynamic axioms is independent of the subjects’ risk attitude. 217
A second objection could be that the eﬀect of the resolution of uncertainty in the prior lottery 218
problems might have a limited impact on individuals’ state of mind given the fact that these 219
questions will not be payed. Subjects may not experience the disappointment or the relief related 220
to the resolution of the prior uncertainty. This could undermine our ﬁndings concerning CON 221
and DC. In fact, this “prediction failure” phenomenon might induce the subjects to give more 222
thought to their answers rather than to give an answer whilst in the grip of their emotions or as 223
a reaction to a “gut feeling”. Consequently, we expect our subjects to satisfy DC and CON more 224
frequently than they would do with real incentives. In addition, it is likely that “prediction fail- 225
ure” will also occur with RIS because each question has a low probability of being selected which 226
could dilute the emotions due to the resolution of uncertainty in a particular prior lottery problem. 227
228
In conclusion, given that there is probably no perfect incentive scheme that goes with our within- 229
subject protocol, we opted for the one that, in our opinion, minimizes the impact of all possible 230
detrimental eﬀects. 231
3.3 Statistical methodology of analysis 232
We present the method of aggregation of our data along two parameter dimensions which aims 233
to improve the clarity and the statistical power of our study. First, we merge the samples for 234
parameter combinations with a similar level of outcomes. More speciﬁcally, we deﬁne xL as the 235
merging of the samples for outcomes (20,15,0)&(24,15,0) and xH as the merging for the samples 236
for outcomes (80,60,0)&(95,60,0). Then, in order to investigate the inﬂuence of one dimension 237
(ratio: rL and rH or outcome levels : xL and xH) on the rate of acceptance/rejection of a dynamic 238
axiom, we merge the samples along the other dimension. Finally, we merge all 8 samples to obtain 239
the most aggregated level of results. This aggregation is a convenient tool for dealing with the 240
scarce data resulting from the loss of observations for CON and DC. For each axiom, we ﬁrst study 241
the acceptance versus rejection rates then we reﬁne our understanding of the rejection behavior 242
by testing the two possible types of rejection (CRE versus RCRE) against each other. In this part, 243
we ﬁrst compare our results to existing evidence in the literature, then we provide new results for 244When Allais meets Ulysses: Dynamic axioms and the Common Ratio Eﬀect 11
each of the 3 dynamic axioms. We further exploit the within-subject characteristic of our data 245
by studying the number of dynamic axioms violated by a subject within the same parameter 246
set. Finally, we investigate the links between the independence axiom and each of these dynamic 247
axioms. 248
4 Results 249
3 subjects out of 114 (2.6%) chose a strictly dominated lottery at least once. We therefore ex- 250
cluded them from the analysis. In Tables 1 and 2, we give the overall experimental results for the 251
remaining 111 subjects. Table 1 presents the rates of choices between U and D for each decision 252
problem and each parameter set. As explained in the previous section, we choose two values for 253
x1 for the same x2 in order to control for diﬀerent levels of risk aversion in our sample. In fact, 254
we observe more choice of the riskiest option, U, for the high levels of x1 (24e and 95e) than for 255
the small levels (20e and 80e). There is only one exception for S1 where U is more frequently 256
observed for 20e than for 24e. 257
CSS
rL = 0.3 rH = 0.7
xL xH xL xH
20e 24e 80e 95e 20e 24e 80e 95e
S1
U1
19 56 37 17 47 56 37 17 47
38.00 50.45 33.33 15.32 42.34 50.45 33.33 15.32 42.34
D1
31 55 74 94 64 55 74 94 64
62.00 49.55 66.67 84.68 57.66 49.55 66.67 84.68 57.66
S2
U2
13 8 15 12 34 28 53 36 60
28.90 28.57 42.86 31.58 68 32.94 51.46 39.13 66.67
D2
32 20 20 26 16 57 50 56 30
71.10 71.43 57.14 68.42 32 67.06 48.54 60.87 33.33
S3
U3
32 43 64 57 80 34 57 53 81
66.70 38.74 57.66 51.35 72.07 30.63 51.35 47.75 72.97
D3
16 68 47 54 31 77 54 58 30
33.30 61.26 42.34 48.65 27.93 69.37 48.65 52.25 27.03
S4
U4
25 45 62 70 68 23 30 20 49
48.10 40.54 55.86 63.06 61.26 20.72 27.03 18.02 44.14
D4
27 66 49 41 43 88 81 91 62
61.90 59.46 44.14 36.94 38.74 79.28 72.97 81.98 55.86
Table 1: Eﬀectives and frequencies of U and D for each problem.
There are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the results of our experiment and the ones of Cubitt et al. 258
(1998)16. The parameter proﬁle (r = 0.3, x1 = 24e, x2 = 15e, x3 = 0) is comparable with the 259
one used by Cubitt et al. (1998) (r = 0.25, x1 = 16£, x2 = 10£, x3 = 0). Let us note that in 260
our design each subject answers each decision problem while this is not the case in Cubitt & al’s 261
16 S1: χ2 = 0.157 p-value=0.692, S2: χ2 = 1.130 p-value=0.288, S3: χ2 = 0.792 p-value=0.374 and S4:
χ2 = 0.577 p-value=0.44812 Nebout, A. and Dubois, D.
experiment. Hence we cannot use the same z-test in order to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between 262
the prior lottery and two-stage problems and to draw conclusion concerning the violation of DC. 263
Table 2 presents the statistics of each pattern of choice for the independence and all the dynamic 264
axioms. First, we compare the results of these two tables with the standard results of the experi- 265
mental literature on the common ratio eﬀect and its dynamic extensions. 266
267
rL = 0.3 rH = 0.7
xL xH xL xH
20e 24e 80e 95e 20e 24e 80e 95e
Obs. 28 35 38 50 85 103 92 90
U1/U2
4 8 3 15 19 25 8 29
14.29 22.86 7.89 30 22.35 24.27 8.7 32.22
CON
D1/D2
9 18 24 13 30 39 50 22
32.13 51.43 63.17 26 35.29 37.86 54.35 24.44
U1/D2
11 2 2 3 27 11 6 8
39.29 5.71 5.26 6 31.76 10.68 6.52 8.89
D1/U2
4 7 9 19 9 28 28 31
14.29 20 23.68 38 10.59 27.19 30.43 34.45
U2/U3
6 13 9 24 12 35 20 50
21.43 37.14 23.68 48 14.12 33.98 21.74 55.56
DC
D2/D3
11 10 10 7 42 34 31 17
39.29 28.57 26.32 14 49.41 33.01 33.70 18.89
U2/D3
2 2 3 10 16 18 16 10
7.14 5.71 7.89 20 18.82 17.48 17.39 11.11
D2/U3
9 10 16 9 15 16 25 13
32.14 28.57 42.11 18 17.65 15.53 27.17 14.44
Obs. 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 111
U3/U4
21 42 40 53 8 21 10 43
18.92 37.84 36.04 47.75 7.21 18.92 9.01 38.74
RCL
D3/D4
44 27 24 16 62 45 48 24
39.64 24.32 21.62 14.42 55.86 40.54 43.24 21.62
U3/D4
22 22 17 27 26 36 43 38
19.82 19.82 15.32 24.32 23.42 32.43 38.74 34.23
D3/U4
24 20 30 15 15 9 10 6
21.62 18.02 27.02 13.51 13.51 8.11 9.01 5.41
U1/U4
21 29 13 30 13 15 6 24
18.92 26.13 11.71 27.03 11.71 13.51 5.41 21.62
IND
D1/D4
31 41 37 26 45 59 80 39
27.93 36.94 33.33 23.42 40.54 53.16 72.07 35.14
U1/D4
35 8 4 17 43 22 11 23
31.53 7.21 3.6 15.32 38.74 19.82 9.91 20.72
D1/U4
24 33 57 38 10 15 14 25
21.62 29.73 51.35 34.23 9.01 13.51 12.61 22.52
Table 2: Eﬀectives and frequencies of choice patterns for each axiom.When Allais meets Ulysses: Dynamic axioms and the Common Ratio Eﬀect 13
Result 1 268
(i) The value of the ratio aﬀects the frequency of rejection of the independence axiom (IND), 269
(ii) The CRE violation of IND (D1/U4) is more frequently observed than RCRE with small ratio value 270
















xL U1/D4 43 65
D1/U4 57 25



















Table 3: Contingency table for IND rejection variable / Frequencies of CRE and RCRE types of
rejection for IND axiom
At the aggregate level (table 2) the IND axiom is rejected in 48.65% of the cases for the small ratio 274
and in 36.71% for the high ratio. The diﬀerence is signiﬁcant (χ2 = 12.447, p-value< 0.001). If we 275
focus on the type of rejection (table 3), D1/U4 is more frequently chosen than U1/D4 for rL while 276
the reverse is true for rH. The diﬀerence between the two contexts is signiﬁcant (χ2 = 35.415, 277
p-value< 0.001). The diﬀerence is also signiﬁcant at the low outcome level (for xL, χ2 = 15.319 278
p-value< 0.001) and the higher one (for xH, χ2 = 16.251 p-value< 0.001). If we consider the 279
data at the x1 level (with no merging), the frequency of [D1/U4] choices for rL is also signiﬁcantly 280
higher than for rH, at all values except x1 = 95 where the statistic is just above the 10% threshold 281
(for x1 = 20: χ2 = 5.293, p-value= 0.021, for x1 = 24: χ2 = 11.479, p-value= 0.001, for x1 = 80: 282
χ2 = 14.762 p-value< 0.001, and for x1 = 95: χ2 = 2.446 p-value= 0.118). 28314 Nebout, A. and Dubois, D.
So, whatever level of aggregation is used, we ﬁnd signiﬁcantly more CRE violations for the small 284
ratio value. For high ratio value, it is the other way around, we observe more frequently the U1/D4 285
pattern than D1/U4 which corresponds to the reverse common ratio eﬀect17. This last result is 286
less known but was already found in Starmer & Sugden (1989). On the outcome dimension, we 287
ﬁnd that the criterion [D1/U4] is more frequently observed than [U1/D4] for xH than for xL
288
(χ2 = 28.628, p-value< 0.001) when aggregating the samples over the ratio dimension. These two 289
results about the rate of CRE violations with regards to the ratio and the outcome levels are 290
in line with McCrimmon & Larsson (1979). In conclusion, these ﬁrst descriptive statistics of the 291
data are consistent with the benchmark studies we are building our experiment on. 292
4.1 Acceptance versus rejection 293
In this section, we provide results comparing the rejection versus the acceptance rate for each 294
of the dynamic axioms. Acceptance of the axiom is obtained for the choice patterns Ui/Uj and 295
Di/Dj, rejection of the axioms for Ui/Dj and Uj/Di. Table 4 presents the descriptive results and 296
allows to draw two conclusions. First, the rate of rejection does not diﬀer among axioms. Second 297
for all three dynamic axioms, the rate of rejection is aﬀected neither by the ratio level nor by 298
the outcome levels. This result is based on a composite measure which aggregates violations in 299
opposite directions. The impact of the diﬀerent parameter sets on the type of violations are more 300
speciﬁcally studied in section 4.2. 301
rL rH
xL xH xL xH
IND
Accept : U1/U4 - D1/D4 54.95 47.75 59.46 67.12
Reject : U1/D4 - D1/U4 45.05 52.25 40.54 32.88
CON
Accept : U1/U2 - D1/D2 61.90 62.50 60.11 59.89
Reject : U1/D2 - D1/U2 38.10 37.50 39.89 40.11
DC
Accept : U2/U3 - D2/D3 63.49 56.82 65.43 64.84
Reject : U2/D3 - D2/U3 36.51 43.18 34.57 35.16
RCL
Accept : U3/U4 - D3/D4 60.36 59.91 61.26 56.31
Reject : U3/D4 - D3/U4 39.64 40.09 38.74 43.69
Table 4: Aggregated frequencies.
Result 2 The frequencies of rejection of CON, DCand RCL axioms: 302
(i) are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each other whatever level is considered. 303
(ii) are not aﬀected neither by the ratio nor by the outcomes levels. 304
17 This case where the risky option is chosen in the scale up problem and the safe option in the scale down
problem. that has been accounted for theoretically by Blavatskyy (2010),When Allais meets Ulysses: Dynamic axioms and the Common Ratio Eﬀect 15
In table 4, we observe that the rate of rejection is similar among the dynamic axioms at each 305
level. None of the Chi-square values of the two by two tests of independence between each dynamic 306
axioms are signiﬁcant (Table 12 in appendix A). We also observe that the rates of rejection are 307
similar for each dynamic axioms at each level . Based on table 4 for proportions and table 13 in 308
appendix A for chi-square values : 309
– CON is rejected (both criteria pooled) in 37.75% of the cases for rL and 40.00% for rH. This 310
diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant (χ2 = 0.143 p-value = 0.705). When we aggregate over the ratios 311
in table 4, CON is rejected also in about 40% of the cases (more precisely 39.44% and 39.26% 312
respectively for xL and xH, this diﬀerence being not signiﬁcant, χ2 = 0.002 p-value=0.963). 313
– DC is rejected (both criteria pooled) in 35.06% of the cases for xL and 37.78% for xH, which 314
is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent (χ2 = 0.306 p-value=0.580). DC is more frequently rejected for rL
315
(40.40%) than for rH (34.86%), but the diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant (χ2 = 1.188 316
p-value=0.276). 317
– RCL is rejected in 39.86% of the cases for rL and 41.22% for rH , a non-signiﬁcant diﬀerence 318
(χ2 = 0.117 p-value=0.733). The diﬀerence of rejection frequency between xL and xH (i.e. 319
when we aggregate over the ratios) is also non-signiﬁcant (39.19% for xL and 41.89% for xH, 320
χ2 = 0.565 p-value=0.452). 321
The fact that we found no particular eﬀect in this result might appear unfortunate but is mainly 322
due to aggregation of both axioms violation directions which masks possible asymmetry in the 323
violations directions and therefore possible eﬀects of the parameters. This more reﬁned study is 324
presented in the next section and is the one comparable with the existing literature because most 325
of the empirical data available only focuss on CRE violations of axioms. 326
4.2 Relation between the parameter set and the type of violation 327
In this section we focus on the two types of violations for each of the dynamic axioms. Recall 328
that the patterns [D1/U2], [D2/U3] and [D3/U4] correspond to dynamic versions of the CRE and 329
will be denoted, for each axiom, as CRE violations. Our approach is systematic and studies the 330
inﬂuence of each parameter level (ratio and outcome) on the rate of the two rejection types (CRE 331
versus RCRE). For each result we present a contingency table for the parameter levels and all the 332
tests are presented in table 14 in appendix A. 333
334
Result 3 The CRE violation of CON (D1/U2): 335
(i) is more frequently observed than RCRE with high outcome level whereas with low outcome level rates 336
of CRE and RCRE violations are even. 33716 Nebout, A. and Dubois, D.














xL U1/D2 13 38
D1/U2 11 37



















Table 5: Contingency table for CON rejection variable / Frequencies of CRE and R-CRE types
of rejection for CON
For i), when we aggregate over the ratio, the distribution of rejections is inverted between the two 339
outcome levels: in table 5, we observe 51.52% of U1/D2 and 48.48% of D1/U2 for low values of 340
x1 and 17.92% of U1/D2 and 82.08% of D1/U2 for high values of x1. This diﬀerence is signiﬁcant 341
(χ2 = 24.214 p-value< 0.001). If we test for diﬀerences at the ratio level we also ﬁnd signiﬁcant 342
diﬀerences (for rL χ2 = 8.066 p-value=0.005 and for rH χ2 = 14.743 p-value< 0.001). For this 343
result, the aggregation process between low outcomes values has an important inﬂuence given 344
that, for x1 = 20, we observe much more RCRE than CRE. 345
Proving ii), the distribution of the rejections between CRE and RCRE is very similar for both 346
ratios at an aggregate level (U1/D2: 31.58% and 35.14%, D1/U2: 68.42% and 64.86% for respec- 347
tively rL and rH, χ2 = 0.100, p-value=0.752) and for each aggregated outcome level18 (for xL, 348
χ2 = 0.004, p-value=0.949 and for xH, χ2 = 0.052, p-value=0.820). To sum up, the ratio level (rL
349
or rH) does not aﬀect the frequency of CRE versus RCRE whether it be at an aggregate level or 350
for each outcome level (table 14). 351
18 It is also true for each outcome level, for x1=20 χ2 = 0.052 p-value=0.820, for x1=24 χ2 = 0.003 p-
value=0.959, for x1=80 χ2=0.171 p-value=0.679 and for x1 = 95 χ2 = 0.105 p-value=0.746When Allais meets Ulysses: Dynamic axioms and the Common Ratio Eﬀect 17
These two results reinforce the idea that the counterfactual reasoning involved in the prior lottery 352
problem after the resolution of the prior risk focusses more on the ﬁnal gains that could have been 353
lost rather than on the probability of having lost these possible gains. Consequently we observe 354
that the outcomes instead of the probability dimension has a non neutral inﬂuence on the type 355
of violation of CON. 356
357
Result 4 The CRE violation of DC (D2/U3): 358
(i) is more frequently observed than RCRE with the small ratio value. 359















xL U2/D3 4 34
D2/U3 19 31



















Table 6: Contingency table for DC rejection variable / Frequencies of CRE and R-CRE types of
rejection for DC
As shown in result 2, the DC axiom is more frequently rejected for rL (40.40%) than for rH
362
(34.86%), but the diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant (χ2 = 1.188 p-value=0.276). However 363
72.13% of the rejection cases for rL are due to the D2/U3 type against 53.49% for rH, a signiﬁcant 364
diﬀerence (χ2 = 5.224 p-value=0.022). More precisely we observe in table 6 that the ratio value 365
aﬀects the rejection type when the x1 values are low (χ2 = 7.079 p-value=0.008) but not when the 36618 Nebout, A. and Dubois, D.
x1 values are high (χ2 = 0.188 p-value=0.664). Moreover the distribution of the rejections between 367
the two types is very similar for both outcomes levels at an aggregate level (D2/U3: 56.82% and 368
61.76%, U2/D3: 43.18% and 38.24% for respectively xL and xH, χ2 = 0.296, p-value=0.586) or 369
for both ratio levels (for rL, χ2 = 1.266, p-value=0.260 and for rH, χ2 = 1.331, p-value=0.249). 370
So, the outcome level (xL or xH) does not aﬀect the frequency of [D2/U3] whether it be at an 371
aggregate level or for each ratio level (table 14). 372
373
We also performed a within-subject test for those participants who answered the prior lottery 374
problem, for both rL = 0.3 and rH = 0.7. Whatever the outcome level (x1 = 20, 24, 80 or 95) 375
we do not observe any signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the numbers of acceptances and rejections 376
for rL and rH (Mc Nemar change test, x1 = 20: χ2 = 0.750 p-value=0.387, x1 = 24: χ2 = 0 377
p-value=1, x1 = 80: χ2 = 0.842 p-value=0.359, x1 = 95: χ2 = 1.389 p-value=0.239). There is 378
also no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between CRE choices for rL and rH except for x1 = 20 (Mc Nemar 379
change test, x1 = 20: χ2 = 3.125 p-value=0.077, x1 = 24: χ2 = 1.777 p-value=0.182, x1 = 80: 380
χ2 = 1.388 p-value=0.239 and x1 = 95: χ2 = 0.100 p-value=0.752). This emphasizes the fact 381
that a dynamically inconsistent participant (in the CRE direction) for rH is also dynamically 382
inconsistent (in the CRE direction) for rL. 383
These results show that violations of DC are driven by the ratio level. This may be explained 384
by the fact that the only diﬀerence between the two-stage and the prior lottery problems is the 385
timing of resolution of the ﬁrst stage lottery. It seems therefore not too surprising that the key 386
variable in terms of behavioral impact is its probability. 387
388
Result 5 The RCRE violation of RCL (D3/U4): 389
(i) is more frequently observed for high ratio values than CRE whereas with for low ratio values the 390
rates of CRE and RCRE violations are even. 391
(ii) is not aﬀected by the outcome level 392
393
At the aggregate level the ratio does not aﬀect the frequency of rejection of the RCL axiom (table 394
4 and 13), since the rejection frequency is around 40% for both samples (χ2 = 0.117, p-value 395
= 0.773). However, the distribution of CRE versus RCRE is very diﬀerent depending on the 396
ratio. For rL, CRE (D3/U4 pattern) represents 50.28% of the rejections (table 7) while it only 397
represents 21.86% for rH. This diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at an aggregate level (χ2 = 30.392, p-value 398
< 0.001). At the aggregated outcome level this diﬀerence is also signiﬁcant (for xL, χ2 = 8.013 399














xL U3/D4 44 62
D3/U4 44 24



















Table 7: Contingency table for RCL rejection variable / Frequencies of CRE and R-CRE types of
rejection for RCL
for all outcome levels except for x1=20, (for x1 = 20: χ2 = 1.546 p-value = 0.214, for x1 = 24: 401
χ2 = 6.266 p-value = 0.012, for x1 = 80: χ2 = 19.151 p-value< 0.001 and for x1 = 95: χ2 = 4.5432 402
p-value=0.033). Finally, the outcome level (xL or xH) does not aﬀect the frequency of [D3/U4] 403
whether it be at an aggregate level (χ2 = 1.283 p-value = 0.157) or for each ratio level (for rL, 404
χ2 = 0.006 p-value = 0.940 and for rH, χ2 = 2.840 p-value = 0.092). 405
4.3 Within subject analysis and robustness of the results 406
In the previous section we displayed aggregated results depending on the parameter dimension we 407
aimed to study. If a within-subject protocol was necessary in order to obtain each axiom variable, 408
this analysis was run in a between-subject perspective. This technic allows us to maintain at a 409
reasonable level the number of observations required to draw conclusions about the inﬂuence of 410
each parameter dimension on the rate of CRE and RCRE violations for each axiom. However, it is 411
possible to further exploit the within-subject characteristic of our protocol by evaluating for each 412
set of parameter the number of violated dynamic axioms depending on the violation or not of the 413
independence axiom (1 or 3 if independence is violated, 0 or 2 when independence is veriﬁed). 414
This allows us to deﬁne individual type depending on the number of switches between U and D 415
from a decision task to another: EU subjects verifying IND and all the three dynamic axioms (O 41620 Nebout, A. and Dubois, D.
switch-type), coherent Non-EU subjects violating IND and only one dynamic axiom (1 switch- 417
type), static EU subjects verifying IND but violating two dynamic axioms in opposite directions 418
(2 switches-type) and random Non-EU subjects who violate IND and all three dynamic axioms 419
for the same parameter set (3 switches-type)19. In addition, we can evaluate the robustness of the 420
results presented in the previous section by excluding anomalous subjects from our sample. 421
4.3.1 Multiple switches statistics 422
In Table 8, we present the number of switches observed for each parameter set on the sample of 423
subjects that answered all four decision tasks. Over the 16 possible patterns of choices in the four 424
decision tasks, 2 correspond to 0 switch (U or D for all four problems), 2 correspond to 3 switches, 425
6 to 1 switch and 6 to 2 switches. Thus a proper comparison of frequencies should be made only 426
between 0 and 3-switches types and 1 and 2-switches types. 427
# rL rH
switches 20 24 80 95 Total 20 24 80 95 Total Total
0
5 13 6 13 37 24 34 25 26 109 146
17.86 37.14 15.79 26 24.50 28.24 33.01 27.17 28.89 29.46 28.02
1
13 15 22 18 68 30 30 18 38 116 184
46.43 42.86 57.89 36 45.03 35.29 29.13 19.57 42.22 31.35 35.32
2
7 6 9 15 37 24 34 44 22 124 161
25 17.14 23.68 30 24.50 28.24 33.01 47.83 24.44 33.51 30.90
3
3 1 1 4 9 7 5 5 4 21 30
10.71 2.86 2.63 8 5.96 8.24 4.85 5.43 4.44 5.68 5.76
NA 83 76 73 61 293 26 8 19 21 74 367
Table 8: Eﬀectives and frequencies of switches
Result 6 About two third of the subjects violate one or no dynamic axiom while one quarter of the 428
subjects verify IND and violate two dynamic axioms in opposite directions. 429
First, the proportion of subjects that systematically switch from U to D from a decision problem 430
to another is very low (around 6%) in comparison to the 0-switch type. This 3-switches type is 431
hard to explain from a theoretical perspective and most likely reveals pure randomness in the sub- 432
jects’ answers. Between 25% and 35% of our subjects behave accordingly with the independence 433
axiom and its dynamic extensions. They therefore always choose the same option (U or D) in each 434
of the 4 decision tasks (0-switch type). They could be thought as expected utility maximizer both 435
in a static and a dynamic framework. This proportion is consistent with other experimental clas- 436
siﬁcation results between EU and Non-EU subjects (Bruhin et al. 2010). The most observed type 437
19 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting us to explore this dimension of our data and to run this
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in our sample is the one we are interested in, i.e. subjects who are not verifying the independence 438
axiom and that consequently do not verify one and only one dynamic axiom. These subjects ﬁt 439
in the framework of the theorems of Karni & Schmeidler (1991) and Volij (1994). This type is 440
observed more frequently for small than for high ratio. This is consistent with the fact that we 441
observe more violations of independence for a small ratio. Finally, there is a last type that has 442
never been investigated neither in the theoretical nor in the experimental literature, i.e. subjects 443
who satisfy the independence axiom but violate two dynamic axioms. This case is possible on a 444
theoretical point of view and would suggest that preferences revealed on single stage prospects 445
could be totally independent of the one revealed on multiple stage prospects. Nevertheless, we 446
observe that between 25% and 30% of our subjects are of this 2-switches type. This is a signiﬁcant 447
proportion of our sample. Therefore it is important to determine if these two switches are random 448
which would suggest that this type should be threaten as noise like the 3-switches type or if these 449
two switches are more systematic which would suggest that this type is behaviorally grounded. 450
Next section investigates this question. 451
4.3.2 2-switches subjects 452
In this section, we isolated the 2-switches subjects for each parameter set. The 6 possible proﬁles 453
are presented in table 9. CRE violations correspond to proﬁles 3 and 4 for CON, proﬁles 2 and 5 454
for DC and proﬁles 1 and 6 for RCL. In table 15, we present the descriptive statistics of these 6 455
proﬁles for each parameter set. 456
Proﬁles CON DC RCL rL rH Total
RCREcon/CRErcl U1/D2 D2/D3 D3/U4
2 10 12
5.41 8.06 7.45
RCREcon/CREdc U1/D2 D2/U3 U3/U4
6 6 12
16.22 4.84 7.45
CREcon/RCRErcl D1/U2 U2/U3 U3/D4
8 37 45
21.62 29.84 27.95
CREcon/RCREdc D1/U2 U2/D3 D3/D4
4 25 29
10.81 20.16 18.01
CREdc/RCRErcl D1/D2 D2/U3 U3/D4
13 43 56
35.14 34.68 34.78
RCREdc/CRErcl U1/U2 U2/D3 D3/U4
4 3 7
10.81 2.42 4.35
Table 9: Proﬁles of 2-switches subjects
Result 7 For the 2-switches types, CRE violations of CON and RCRE violations of RCL represent 457
more than 75% of the subsample. 45822 Nebout, A. and Dubois, D.
We observe that for all our parameter sets, the proﬁles 3 and 5 represent more than 50% of 459
the 2-switches types. These two proﬁles correspond to RCRE behavior in RCL (i.e. U3/D4). In 460
particular, proﬁle 5 correspond to CRE behavior in DC. Table 15 in appendix A shows that the 461
proﬁles distribution within 2-switches subjects is not random as proﬁles 3, 4 and 5 contains more 462
than 75% of the eﬀectives for each parameter set. 463
In addition, an interesting feature of these within subject analysis is that it sheds light on one 464
of the between subject results of Cubitt et al. (1998). Indeed, they detect a signiﬁcant diﬀerence 465
between the frequencies of choices of U in S2 and S3 (28.9% versus 66.7%) suggesting a CRE 466
violation of DC, but also between the frequencies of choices of U in S3 and S4 (66.7% versus 48.1%) 467
suggesting, on the contrary, a RCRE violation of RCL. These two results seems paradoxical with 468
the hypothesis of a representative agent either verifying independence, either exhibiting CRE 469
behavior and violating one and only one dynamic axiom. In fact, under this assumption, the 470
frequencies of choices of U should be increasing from S1 to S4. Our study of 2-switches reconcile 471
these two apparently contradictory results of Cubitt et al. (1998) because our within subject 472
protocol allows identiﬁcation of subject verifying independence but not some dynamic axioms 473
whereas it is not possible with a between-subject protocol. 474
This section supports the idea that preferences towards dynamic prospects are not only a subset 475
of preferences towards single stage prospects because they characterize more complex behavioral 476
traits. This is consistent with the ﬁnding of subjects that verify the independence axiom in a 477
static context but that can be inﬂuenced in opposite directions by the diﬀerent characteristics of 478
the timing of resolution of uncertainty (ex-post, ex ante or simultaneous). 479
However, we cannot exclude the possibility of these 2-switches type subjects just be due to tremble 480
or noise. Therefore it is necessary to check that the results we presented in section 4.2 are robust 481
to their exclusion of our analysis. 482
4.3.3 Robustness 483
In this section, we exclude the 2 and 3-switches types from our analysis and present in Table 10, 484
the contingency tables of the rejection types for each dynamic axiom. 485
Result 8 All the results presented in section 4.2 are preserved on this subsample and we detect stronger 486
eﬀect than on the whole sample. 487
– Result 3 holds : For CON, CRE is observed more frequently for high outcomes than for low out- 488
comes. More precisely, 72.22% of U2/D3 and 27.78% of D3/U2 are observed for low outcomes, 489
while the frequencies are respectively 14.63% and 85.37% for high outcomes, the diﬀerence 490
is statistically signiﬁcant (χ2(1)=23.857 p-value<0.001). The diﬀerence is also signiﬁcant for 491When Allais meets Ulysses: Dynamic axioms and the Common Ratio Eﬀect 23
CON DC RCL
rL rH rL rH rL rH
xL
U/D 6 20 2 15 12 17
D/U 6 4 9 5 23 9
xH
U/D 1 5 1 7 13 19
D/U 15 20 13 4 32 8
Total
U/D 7 25 3 22 25 36
D/U 21 24 22 9 55 17
Table 10: Eﬀectives for each axioms, without 2 and 3 switchs subjects
each ratio level (rL: χ2(1) = 4.861 p-value=0.027, rH : χ2(1) = 17.202 p-value<0.001). If we 492
aggregate the outcome levels and test for the eﬀects of the ratio, the frequencies of observa- 493
tion of (U2/D3, D3/U2) for rL and rH are respectively (25%, 75%) and (51.02%, 48.98%), a 494
diﬀerence signiﬁcant (χ2(1) = 3.954 p-value=0.047). 495
– Result 4 holds : For DC, CRE is observed more frequently than RCRE for small ratio whereas 496
it is the contrary for high ratio, thus the ratio has a signiﬁcant impact on the rejection criterion 497
(χ2(1) = 17.159 p-value<0.001). There is no outcomes eﬀect (χ2(1) = 2.070 p-value=0.150). 498
– Result 5 holds : For RCL, CRE is observed more frequently than RCRE for small ratio whereas 499
it is the contrary for high ratio, thus the ratio has a signiﬁcant impact on the rejection criterion 500
(χ2(1) = 15.824 p-value<0.001). There is no outcomes eﬀect (χ2(1) = 0.033 p-value=0.855). 501
4.4 Associations 502
Result 9 Whatever level is considered (global, aggregated over ratios and aggregated over outcomes) 503
there is an association between the acceptance/rejection of IND and CON. For the other axioms, we 504
ﬁnd no association. 505
IND * RCL IND * CON IND * DC
Total 1.496ns 16.519∗∗∗ 1.904ns
ratios aggregated
xL 0.689ns 7.550∗∗∗ 7.266∗∗∗
xH 1.514ns 8.236∗∗∗ 0.276ns
outcomes aggregated
rL 0.215ns 6.232∗∗ 0.631ns
rH 1.597ns 10.436∗∗∗ 0.712ns
ns not signiﬁcant ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%
Table 11: Chi-square values for association between axiom’s rejection variables
Table 11 reports the Chi-square values of the two by two tests of association between the two 506
modality variables (Accept/Reject) for IND and each dynamic axiom. For CON, we ﬁnd a system- 507
atic signiﬁcant association between the two variables. For the other axioms, there is no signiﬁcant 50824 Nebout, A. and Dubois, D.
association (except for DC for small outcomes values). Given the analysis presented in section 509
4.3, this result reinforces the idea that dynamic preferences are not necessarily connected to pref- 510
erences over single stage prospects. It is therefore not surprising to ﬁnd that CON is the axiom 511
that relates the closest to IND as the prior lottery problem also involves choices between single 512
stage prospects (although a prior uncertainty has been resolved). This result gives credit to the 513
argument of Machina (1989) saying that CON is a dynamic version of IND. It also suggests that 514
choices involving multiple stage lotteries require other reasoning mechanisms than the one used 515
in standard static choices. 516
5 Conclusion 517
This study provides new empirical evidence concerning individual dynamic preferences. Taking 518
McCrimmon & Larsson (1979) and Cubitt et al. (1998) as a starting point, we go further than 519
these studies insofar our experimental design takes account of individuals’ heterogeneity20 in 520
allowing multiple tests of behavioral axioms at the individual level. This design allows us to 521
test for the acceptance/rejection of all three dynamic axioms (RCL, CON, and DC) and of the 522
independence axiom at an individual level. On the one hand, it brings out the inﬂuence of the 523
ratio value and of the outcome level on the rate of violation of these axioms and more speciﬁcally 524
on the rate of violation corresponding to the Common Ratio Eﬀect versus the Reverse Common 525
Ratio Eﬀect. On the other hand, it provides information at an individual level about the link 526
between violations of the Independence axiom and its dynamic extensions. In fact, we test the 527
implicit theoretical assumption stating that the violation of a dynamic axiom necessarily implies 528
the violation of independence and ﬁnd that it is not always veriﬁed. Finally, we test the association 529
between independence and each of the dynamic axioms. 530
Experimental investigationof individual attitudes toward dynamic prospects faces several method- 531
ological diﬃculties : complexity of the decision task, loss of data induced by the prior lottery prob- 532
lem and correct incentivization of the experiment. We construct our experimental design under 533
these constraints and on this last issue, we prefer to use hypothetical incentives21 ; nevertheless 534
our data is in line with the aforementioned benchmark studies on CRE and dynamic preferences. 535
Our study reveals that none of the dynamic axioms are more rejected than others and that their 536
rejection rates are not aﬀected by the ratio or outcome levels. However, for each dynamic axiom, 537
the rate of CRE violations versus RCRE violations depends on the ratio and outcome values 538
as follows : (i) for Consequentialism, the rate of CRE violations is higher than RCRE for large 539
20 For a discussion of the diﬀerences between within- and between-subjects experiments, see for example
Ballinger & Wilcox (1997)
21 Nebout & Willinger (2012) use real incentives (RIS) and collected data that, for DC and CON , are consistent
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outcome levels but does not depend on the ratio level, (ii) for Dynamic Consistency, the frequency 540
of CRE is higher than RCRE for large ratio levels but does not depend on the outcomes level and 541
(iii) for the Reduction of Compound Lotteries the frequency of RCRE is higher than CRE for high 542
ratio levels but does not depend on the outcomes level. For CON, this result could be explained by 543
the fact that the counterfactual reasoning involved in the evaluation of the prior lottery problem 544
by a Non-Consequentialist decision maker is probably less focused on the probability of occurrence 545
of a forgone event than on the level of the outcome that could have been lost. This could plead 546
in favor of an interpretation of Non-Consequentialist behavior in terms of changing reference 547
point as proposed by Barkan & Busemeyer (2003)22. For DC, as the main diﬀerence between the 548
prior and the two stage problems resides in the timing of resolution of the ﬁrst stage lottery, it 549
seems appropriate that its probability is the relevant variable to consider when looking at choice 550
diﬀerences between the two problems. 551
In addition, our within-subject analysis allows us to distinguish between EU subject verifying IND 552
and all three dynamic axioms, coherent Non-EU subjects violating IND and only one dynamic 553
axiom, static EU subjects verifying IND but violating two dynamic axioms in opposite directions 554
and ﬁnally random Non-EU subjects who violate IND and all three dynamic axioms for the same 555
parameter set. We ﬁnd that about two thirds of the subjects violate one or no dynamic axioms 556
(EU and coherent Non-EU) while one quarter of the subjects verify IND and violate two dynamic 557
axioms in opposite directions. For this last subsample, we ﬁnd that the two violations are not 558
random as more than 75% of these subjects exhibit CRE violations of CON and RCRE violations 559
of RCL. This suggested that static and dynamic preferences are not as intimately connected as 560
maintained in the theoretical literature. This idea is reinforced by the fact that we only found an 561
association between IND and CON when we crossed the acceptance/rejection variables between 562
independence and each of the dynamic axioms. This result is consistent with Machina (1989)’s 563
claim saying that: “consequentialism is essentially a dynamic version of the separability that 564
non-expected utility maximizers reject”, p1642. 565
This study on the violation of the Independence axiom in the CRE fashion could also be carried 566
out with the common consequence version of the Allais paradoxes. Our study of independence 567
under risk may also be extended to the case where the probabilities in the lotteries are unknown 568
as in Maher & Kashima (1997) who build an experiment on the three colour Ellsberg paradox 569
and also test the inﬂuence of the resolution of uncertainty on individual preferences in the case of 570
uncertainty. 571
572
22 In the case of what these authors call dynamic inconsistency which a more general deﬁnition than ours and
could also be due to Non-Consequentialism using our terminologies.26 Nebout, A. and Dubois, D.
In conclusion, this experimental study is compatible with the revealed preference paradigm be- 573
cause each decision problem consists of a single binary choice between well-deﬁned prospects. 574
However the set of prospects over which these dynamic preferences are deﬁned is more compli- 575
cated than the set of single stage lotteries used in the standard models of decision under risk. 576
This set contains lotteries that could have multiple stages and diﬀerent timing of resolution of 577
uncertainty. The experimental results presented deepen our understanding of the independence 578
axiom and of the probability mixture operation in a dynamic framework. Our ﬁndings may be rel- 579
evant to the study of sequential decision making (i.e. where more than one decision are involved). 580
Indeed, an interesting topic for future research in this direction would be to use, as a primitive, 581
a preference relation that remains observable (unlike plans or strategies) and incorporates the 582
dynamic characteristics that are relevant in sequential decision problems. For example, Nebout 583
(2012) and Nebout & Willinger (2012) use this approach in order to propose a categorization and 584
a way to reveal strategies in sequential decision problems given the properties of the dynamic 585
preferences (i.e. acceptance or rejection of DC, CON and RCL). 586When Allais meets Ulysses: Dynamic axioms and the Common Ratio Eﬀect 27
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Appendices
A Additional statistics
RCL * CON RCL * DC CON * DC
Global 0.148ns 2.120ns 0.799ns
ratios aggregated
xL 0.600ns 0.995ns 0.852ns
xH 0.378ns 1.016ns 0.070ns
outcomes aggregated
rL 0.132ns 0.000ns 0.125ns
rH 0.779ns 3.181ns 1.870ns
ns not signiﬁcant ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%
Table 12: Chi-square values of association between Accept/Reject variables
IND RCL CON DC
rL vs. rH
Total 12.447∗∗∗ 0.117ns 0.143ns 1.188ns
xL 0.388ns 0.010ns 0.011ns 0.016ns
xH 16.251∗∗∗ 0.453ns 0.078ns 1.299ns
xL vs. xH
Total 0.000ns 0.565ns 0.002ns 0.306ns
rL 2.029ns 0.000ns 0.009ns 0.430ns
rH 2.482ns 0.930ns 0.004ns 0.000ns
ns not signiﬁcant ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%
Table 13: Chi-square values for Accept/Reject variables depending of the parameter levels.
IND RCL CON DC
rL vs. rH
Total 35.415∗∗∗ 30.392∗∗∗ 0.100 5.224∗∗
xL 15.319∗∗∗ 8.013∗∗ 0.004 7.079∗∗
xH 16.251∗∗∗ 22.919∗∗∗ 0.052 0.188
xL vs. xH
Total 28.628∗∗∗ 1.283 24.214∗∗∗ 0.296
rL 14.793∗∗∗ 0.006 8.066∗∗ 0.260
rH 10.068∗∗ 2.840 14.743∗∗∗ 1 .331
∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%
Table 14: Chi-square values of the independence tests between CRE and RCRE for diﬀerent
parameter levelsWhen Allais meets Ulysses: Dynamic axioms and the Common Ratio Eﬀect 31
r=0.3 r=0.7
Proﬁle 20 24 80 95 Total 20 24 80 95 Total Total
1 1 1 0 0 2 6 2 2 0 10 12
14.29 16.67 0 0 5.41 25 5.88 4.55 0 8.06 7.45
2 2 1 1 2 6 1 1 1 3 6 12
28.57 16.67 11.11 13.33 16.22 4.17 2.94 2.27 13.64 4.84 7.45
3
1 2 1 4 8 4 13 11 9 37 45
14.29 33.33 11.11 26.67 21.62 16.67 38.24 25 40.91 29.84 27.95
4
0 0 1 3 4 4 8 8 5 25 29
0 0 11.11 20 10.81 16.67 23.53 18.18 22.73 20.16 18.01
5
3 2 5 3 13 7 9 22 5 43 56
42.86 33.33 55.56 20 35.14 29.17 26.47 50 22.73 34.68 34.78
6
0 0 1 3 4 2 1 0 0 3 7
0 0 11.11 20 10.81 8.33 2.94 0 0 2.42 4.35
Table 15: Eﬀectives and frequencies of each proﬁle for 2-switches subjects32 Nebout, A. and Dubois, D.
B Screenshots
Fig. 3: Scaled up problem (S1)
Fig. 4: Scaled down problem (S4)When Allais meets Ulysses: Dynamic axioms and the Common Ratio Eﬀect 33
Fig. 5: Two stages problem (S3)
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